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Using Informational Labeling to
Influence the Market for Quality in Food
Products
Julie A. Caswell and Eliza M. Mojduszka
New technologies, scientific discoveries, inforperformance. Major categories of food product
mation about linkages between diet and health,
quality attributes include food safety (e.g., levand the mass communication of this knowledge
els of microbial pathogens, residues), nutrito consumers leads to increased demand for

tional, value (e.g., compositional integrity,

higher-quality foods, especially in higher-intaste), package, and process (e.g., animal welcome countries. Food producers and retailers
fare, environmental impact) attributes (Hooker
have responded to these changes in consumer
and Caswell). Food quality attributes can be redemand by modifying and extending the variety
garded as having a demand and supply that inof foods offered for sale. They are also engagteract to determine a market clearing price. The
demand for food safety, for example, is detering in more intensive marketing of particular
attributes of food products, especially nutrimined by consumers' willingness to pay for adtional attributes; the marketing of safety
at- safety, reflecting the value placed upon
ditional
tributes is also beginning to develop.
the benefits that they derive. As with other
Government policies and regulations on
la- it is assumed that consumers are willing
goods,
beling, in conjunction with input, process,
and less for each additional unit of safety
to pay
(Swinbank).
performance standards for food products,
sigIn real-world situations, consumers choose
nificantly influence how markets for food qual-

foods within the context of a total diet in order
ity function and develop. In the United States,
the federal government is increasingly using
into obtain
greater expected utility from their
formational labeling as a means of shaping
food.(a)
Part of that utility derives from using
consumers' knowledge, purchasing patterns,
andto maintain or improve health status (van
food
Ravenswaay).
Consumers with different risk
use practices, and (b) manufacturers' product
ofpreferences
rationally choose different bundles
ferings and marketing practices. Prominent
exof food
foods. However, if their perceptions of the
amples are mandatory nutrition labels on all
quality
products, and safe handling labels for fresh
meat attributes of foods are incorrect, conand poultry. Our discussion here focuses onsumers
eco- lose utility. For example, if their pernomic rationales for labeling policies andceptions
issues of the risks or hazards associated with

related to how the success or failure of these

policies should be judged.

foods are incorrect, consumers either take more

risks than they would ideally like or pay more
than they should for a higher-than-optimal level
of food safety.

Food producers will supply food quality if it

Food Product Quality

is profitable for them or if they are required to

Product quality is usefully described, using
do so. The contribution to profitability may
Lancaster's approach, as a bundle of characterstem from increased product differentiation,
istics (attributes) that determine the product's
sales, and perhaps prices, or from avoidance of
costly events such as a food-borne illness outbreak with associated tort liability. In general,
Julie A. Caswell is professor and Eliza M. Mojduszka is research
the marginal cost of additional units of food
assistant in the Department of Resource Economics, University of
quality is likely to rise. Thus the market for
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(marginal cost) curve and a falling demand

(marginal benefit) curve (Kinsey; Henson and
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tors. In addition, economic
models that try to
Traill; Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington).
For
markets for quality
example, the supply of safetyexplain
is determined
bycan only effectively
deal with
one type of attribute
at a time.
the cost of producing incremental
reductions
in
attributes or goods the main isrisk. The level of safety suppliedWith
by search
the market
sue is product
selection-the
quality and diverinteraction of demand and supply
reflects
a
sity ofnot
goods necessarsupplied. Spence (1975, 1976)
level of risk which is acceptable,
in his earlythese
work that the single prodily zero. Under perfect market showed
conditions,
uct market
producer's incentive
to provide quality is
curves intersect at a particular
clearing
related
to the of
marginal
willingness to pay for
price providing the optimum
level
food
quality, for the marginal consumer in the case
safety.
The above scenario assumes that all market
of a monopolist and for the average consumer
in the case of a competitive producer. Because
participants are fully informed about the nature
of the product, that both buyers and sellers
of are
the way the market for search attributes operates, they have been a relatively minor focus
price takers, and finally, that market prices
of government
regulatory activities. In these
fully reflect all the costs borne and benefits
enmarkets,
consumer information is relatively
joyed by the society. In such a situation,
the
plentiful and easily attained so consumers can
market price will transmit all necessary informaprotect themselves, and their purchasing pattion, externalities will not exist, and government
terns
provide direct incentives to producers to
regulation is not required. In such a market,
a variety of products with different associated provide
quality the range of quality consumers are
(e.g., risk or nutrition levels) will be offered
for to pay for. Furthermore, in food product
willing
sale at a variety of prices.
markets consumers make frequent purchases,
We know, however, that the market for and
food
most search attributes (e.g., color) are what
quality is not perfect. The most significantweimterm value attributes. They are not related to

perfections are that sellers are better informed
safety or nutrition so the consequence of conabout quality attributes than consumers,
con- being temporarily misled is injuries to
sumers
their
pocketbooks but not to their health. Inforsumers may have misperceptions of the
risks
and hazards of consuming particular foods,
and labeling programs are less likely to be
mational
instituted for search attributes because the marfood quality and information about food quality
may have public good characteristics. In this
ketcase,
functions relatively well with respect to
them.
food quality (e.g., safety, nutritional quality)
may
be over- or undersupplied and government often
For experience attributes, the most important issue is information and how consumers can learn
intervenes in an attempt to correct imperfections or mitigate their effects.
about product quality. What incentives do firms
have to supply quality? What prevents firms from
taking advantage of imperfect information concerning product characteristics and selling poorEconomic Models of Quality and Quality

quality commodities, which cost less to produce
than high-quality commodities? There is a moral
The greatest leverage in understanding
how
hazard
for the producer who sells an experience
consumer markets for food quality operate
is
good without
a warranty to one-time consumers
gained by using the distinction developed
by there is no penalty for selling inferior
because
Nelson (1970, 1974) and Darby and Karni
beproducts.
Models of markets for experience goods
tween search, experience, and credence focus
goods
on how consumers can gain information on
and applying it to product attributes. For search
quality to inform their purchases. Bagwell and
attributes (or goods), consumers can determine
Riordan, for example, considered an informedconsumers model where consumers enter the mara product's quality before they buy it by examining or researching the product. For experiket sequentially. In this case, some consumers
ence attributes (or goods), consumers cannot
will know the quality and some will not. Effidetermine a product's quality until they buy
andmay be improved if the knowledge of the
ciency
use it. With credence attributes (or goods),informed
conconsumers can be used by previously
sumers cannot determine the product's uninformed
quality
consumers. Government may play a
even after they buy and consume it. Because
role in increasing the number of informed conthe information environments for these three
sumers by facilitating communication. An extypes of attributes are so different, they pose
ample would be inclusion of some form of convery different issues for marketers and regulasumer rating on product labels.

Signaling
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problems
markets
attributes, in
with the
above models givingfor
insight

exp

ence goods may also
be
mitigated
if
into the
operation
of markets for them. For
ex- con
make repeated purchases
ofas a
w
ample, attributes such
tasteproduct
and cooking
their choices are based
experience
propertieson
can beprior
readily assessed
by consumers during
use. For these attributes,
reputation
product quality. In
economic
models
models with qualityis
signaling
match how marsituation where reputation
important,
a
result is that equilibria
require
to
kets operate. Government
is unlikelyprice
to become
heavily
involved Leffler,
in requiring informational
lamarginal cost (Klein
and
Allen,
beling of these attributes
because with repeated
1982, 1983). In repeated
purchase
situat
purchases the market can satisfactorily
firms producing low-quality
wouldselflose
For

the

reputation

correct.
mechanism

to

work

as

safety and nutritional
characteristicscon
are
centive to firms toFood
produce
quality,
must have some degree
of loyalty
h
experience attributes
in some respects. to
For exif a loyalty
consumer eats aamong
particular food
quality firms. Theample,
less
cu
product
and experiences
food-borne
ers, the higher the
price
has a to
be illness
to as
pr
a result,
or she has gained direct knowledge
firms from cheating
on hequality.
A key factor in determining
whether
ma
of the quality of that product.
Several factors
for

higher

quality

interfere, however, withattributes
food safety operating op
experience

effectively is the assuccess
of quality
sig
an experience attribute.
In many cases consumers may not be warranties)
able to link accurately a b
(e.g., labeling, advertising,
particular
product with an
incidence of illness
ducers to consumers.
Several
quality-sig
or even
be aware of a possible link. The inabilmodels explore how
communication
bet
ity to pinpoint
cause and
effect makes
ex posta
sellers and consumers
takes
place,
and

sult

how

markets

Akerlof's classic "lemons" model deals with

evaluation
of safety as a qualitygoods
attribute diffifor
experience
per

cult. This is particularly true if longer periods
of selltime intervene between consumption of a
the case where quality signaling between
product and ill effects, as may be the case with
ers, who have good information on product
some types of residue exposure. Similarly, the
quality, and buyers, who have poor information,
ill may
effects of a nutritionally poor diet occur over
is totally ineffective. In this case, a market
a period of time, making links between specific
not exist or only the lowest-quality product
products and ill effects difficult for consumers
may be sold because of the adverse selection
to make.
problem: if quality cannot be signaled, higherInformed consumer and reputational models
quality products cannot get a price premium,

of markets for experience attributes do not apand only lower-quality products will be offered
for sale. On the other hand, Grossman's "unply well to food safety and nutritional at-

folding model" predicts a smoothly operatingtributes because of the consumer's problem in
market for experience goods when quality sig-forming a quality judgment. Furthermore, for
naling is totally effective, costless, and truthful,food safety, even if cause and effect relationand consumers can costlessly verify quality af-ships are relatively well known (e.g., eating a
ter making their purchases. Price premiums for contaminated product will result in illness), the
higher-quality products encourage firms to dis- probability of a product being contaminated

close the exact quality of their products and amay not be well known. Thus it is uncertain

how well one's former experience predicts fumarket exists for varying levels of quality.
Improving information (i.e., moving from the ture experience. For these reasons, it is useful

Akerlof toward the Grossman world) throughto treat food safety and nutrition as credence
means such as advertising and labeling mayattributes where the consumer has significant
solve or mitigate the quality-signaling problem. difficulty or cannot assess quality even after
Whether consumers gain from being providedconsumption.
Economic models of quality hit a dead end
additional information depends on their relative
transaction costs for becoming informed andwhen they come to discussion of credence athow receptive they are to the messages. Usingtributes or goods because information is so iminformation imposes costs upon consumers. perfect that these markets for quality simply do
Those who attach little value to particular qual-not function well. As noted above, the food
ity attributes may choose to ignore information safety and nutritional attributes of food are
about them.

largely credence attributes. The key factor that

Many food quality attributes are experience makes them credence attributes is that it is not
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practicable for individual consumers
to assess
Quality signaling
through product labeling and
the quality of the product. For
example,
an ininformation
disclosure
requirements encourages
dividual consumer will not find market
it practicable
to relatively limited govincentives with
ernment involvement,
which is consistent with
test the protein content or food-borne
pathogen
the regulatory philosophy of many policy mak-

contamination level of his or her food. The con-

sumer cannot measure the quality and also ers.
cannot learn it from his or her experience in conInformation remedies can take a variety o
suming the product. Informed consumer and
forms, including the mandatory disclosure
reputational models of markets for quality doinformation
not
about the nature of a product an
apply here. Quality signaling may still be used how
but it should be used, controls on voluntar
requires a reputable certification agent whom
claims in product promotion and the use of pro
consumers can trust. It is in this context that govuct names, provision of public information a
ernment often chooses to play a role in making
education, and subsidies for the provision of in
Our discussion focuses on the first two
it practicable for consumers to assess quality formation.
by
requiring informational labeling.
remedies and their effect on quality and quality
signaling at the interface between government re-

Transforming Experience and Credence

quirements, manufacturer response, and consumer demand. Mandatory information disclo-

sures often garner more attention than controls
on voluntary claims, but both are important and
The presence of imperfect information, transacthey often work in tandem.
tion costs in acquiring and using information,
For example, both forms of information reguand externalities may make private markets lation
for
are used by the Nutrition Labeling and
quality work inefficiently. In these cases, policy
Education Act of 1990 (NLEA), which went
makers often look for correction tools. One of
into effect in 1994. Nutrition labeling is mandathese tools can be direct government regulation
tory in the form of a standardized nutrition inAttributes into Search Attributes

of production processes or product characterisformation panel that presents data on the
macrotics, but such regulation is often criticized
as and micronutrients found in a food. In
economically irrational and costly. In response
addition, voluntary nutrient content claims
to this criticism, there has been some move(e.g., low sodium, high fiber) and health claims
ment away from traditional forms of regulation (e.g., claims linking increased consumption of a
toward interventions that are believed to be
nutrient to lower incidence of a specific disease)
more compatible with seller and consumer
in-that are made outside the standardized incentives. This has resulted in increased interest
formation panel are circumscribed by the law.
in techniques that ensure that consumers have
These types of voluntarily provided informasufficient information to protect themselves
tion are regulated in order to prevent deception
against unsafe products or unfair seller behavand to facilitate product evaluation by consumior. Economists have argued that if the governers. Under the NLEA, a voluntary low-fat claim
ment has the choice between banning a risky
means the same thing whether it appears on a
product or activity and providing information
bag of potato chips or a can of soup and, in
about the risks involved, it should choose infor-fact, means that the product is low fat as demation provision (Magat and Viscusi).
fined by the regulation.

Over the last decade, the U.S. governmentWhether they mandate information or simply

has placed a stronger emphasis on use of inforcircumscribe voluntarily provided information,
mation provision programs as a means of influ-labeling regulations result in a basic transformation of the information environment in marencing economic behavior. Providing additional

or different information is attractive because it kets for quality attributes. They do so by trans-

is a demand-led instrument, which may be efforming former experience or credence at-

fective in giving consumers the means for maktributes into search attributes. (They may also
ing better decisions. If information problems can
improve the information environment for
be solved directly through informational regulasearch attributes themselves.) Mandatory distion, more stringent forms of regulation such as
closures, for example, make it practicable for
process or performance standards will not be reconsumers to judge quality before purchasing a
quired. These latter approaches raise concerns beproduct by establishing a quality scale, requircause they may restrict both consumer and proing testing of quality, and mandating a report-

ducer choice and increase costs unnecessarily.
ing format. Regulation of voluntary claims
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serves similar purposes.
changes in marketsThe
affect the monitorin
ultimate targets
enforcement activities
of
governme
of policy such
as thethe
health status
of consumattempt to ensure that
theproblem
disclosures
ers? A significant
with evaluating the ma
truthful and credible.
example,
effectivenessFor
of informational
labeling require- man
nutrition labeling ments
makes
characteristics
is that the programs
are often complefat content into search attributes that can be
mentary to or coincidental with other forces inverified by reading the package label, while
fluencing markets for quality. Measuring a
government oversight of claims increasesseparate,
their distinct effect for labeling programs is
difficult in these circumstances.
credibility. Thus labeling policies are intended
to improve the quantity, and often the nature,
ofexample, markets for nutritional quality
For
were already changing significantly prior to
quality signaling in markets in order to improve
implementation
of the NLEA in 1994. Ippolito
the functioning of markets for quality
attributes.

and Mathios found that in the late 1980s con-

were changing their purchasing patterns
Informational labeling for food safetysumers
atfor ready-to-eat cereal as they became intributes is currently in an early stage of devel-

opment. As with nutrition, labeling of formed
food of the health benefits of cereal con-

sumption
and that advertising was an important
safety attributes transforms credence
into

source
search attributes, although several special
cir- of information. Frazio and Allshouse
cumstances make the information environment
used scanner data for the years 1989-93 to
document strong growth in the availability of
for food safety distinct from that of nutrition.
One of these circumstances is that some food
nutritionally improved versions of foods in
thirty-seven food categories. Zarkin and Andersafety attributes such as food-borne pathogen
son suggest that the direction and magnitude of
levels can change considerably after the proddemand changes as a result of implementation
uct leaves the processing plant, raising ques-

tions about the point at which quality shouldofbethe NLEA depend on whether consumers initially over- or underestimated the nutrient con-

measured and labeled. Another is whether la-

tent of foods. However, distinguishing the imbeling of safety levels is acceptable to policy
makers, food companies, and consumers. pact of nutrition labels from that of other factors such as press coverage of links between
Labeling to inform users about recommended
and health or doctors' recommendafood handling practices is yet a different nutrition
case.
tions is difficult. Research that attempts to do
For example, in the wake of the E. coli
0157:H7 outbreak in the western United States
just that is underway.
A second complicating factor in evaluating
in early 1993, the U.S. Department of Agricullabeling policy is that it influences markets for
ture required all fresh meat and poultry prodquality in a variety of ways. Caswell and
ucts to carry safe handling labels. These labels
Padberg argued that the role of labeling should
communicate safe handling practices including
be viewed in a much broader sense that goes
recommended storage, cooking temperature,
beyond its influence as a direct shopping aid
and sanitation practices. They do not differentifor consumers. These roles include influencing
ate between beef products, for example, beproduct design, advertising, consumer conficause all products carry the same label, but may
dence in food quality, and consumer education
serve to differentiate between meat products in
on diet and health.
general and other food products that do not
Finally, relationships between levels of concarry specific handling instructions. How this
information and behavior are complex.
type of informational labeling functionssumer
in
For example, extensive work by Viscusi and
practice as a quality signal depends on whether
Magat (1987, 1992) examined how people alter
consumers interpret it as an indicator of poor
their behavior in response to hazard warnings
quality (e.g., the product poses a significant
and risk labeling in a variety of settings. Their
risk) or simply as a reminder to use good
findings provide specific directives for when
kitchen practices.
different types of information provision instruments are effective and when they are not, as

Are Labeling Policies Effective?

well as which kinds of instruments will have

the greatest impact. The implications of this
How do the changes labeling policies make and
in other empirical and theoretical research on
policies that provide information is that labels
the information environment affect the market
for quality in food products? And how do those can change consumers' levels of understanding

Caswell and Mojduszka Informational Labeling and Food Quality 1253

andtheir
Regimesconfor Food Safety: A Comparison of
about quality attributes and alter
North American
and European Approaches." The
sumption behavior. However, variation
across
of Reducing Health Risk from Food.
consumers in their responses to theEconomics
information
J.A. Caswell, ed., pp. 1-17. Storrs CT: Food Marcan be expected.
keting Policy Center, 1996.
We think informational labeling requirements
P.M.,on
and deA.D. Mathios. "Information, Adare likely to have a significantIppolito,
impact
and for
Health Choices." Rand J. Econ.
mand patterns and the dynamics ofvertising,
markets
21(1990):459-80.
food quality. As information about product
quality and use characteristics improves, manu- Kinsey, J. "GATT and the Economics of Food
Safety." Food Policy 18(1993):163-76.
facturers will compete for market shares from
Klein, B., and K. Leffler. "The Role of Market
sales to attribute-conscious, label-using consumers. Products and industries with less desir-

Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance." J.

Polit. Econ. 81(1981):615-41.
able quality profiles may reformulate or redeLancaster, K. Consumer Demand: A New Approach.
sign processes to avoid unfavorable comparisons with other products. As labeling solutions
New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.
Magat,
to information problems in markets for
foodW.A., and W.K. Viscusi. Informational Approaches
to Regulation. Cambridge MA: MIT
product quality are relied upon more heavily,
it
Press, 1992.
is important to make the ex post effort to evaluNelson,
ate what impact this informational labeling
is P. "Advertising as Information." J. Polit.
Econ. 81(1974):729-54.
having.
. "Information and Consumer Behavior." J. Polit.

Econ. 78(1970):311-29.
Shapiro, C. "Premiums for High Quality Products as
Rents to Reputation." Quart. J. Econ.
Akerlof, G.A. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality 98(1983):659-80.
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism."
. "Consumer Information, Product Quality, and
Quart. J. Econ. 84(1970):488-500.
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Paper 705 (1986), CMSEMS, Northwestern
University.
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EC's Internal Market, Mutual Recognition, and
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